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REAL WAGES OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
ABSTRACT
Thispaper is an examination of cyclical real wage behavior in the United States
since World War II. Like most previous aggregate studies. ours finds little cyclicalitv in
aggregate industry real wage data. On the other hand, our analysis of longitudinal
microdata from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics reveals substantial procyclicality.
Wefindthat this procyclicality is obscured in industry average wage statistics, and to a
lesser extent in economywide averages, because those statistics are constructed in a way
that gives greater weight to low-wage workers during expansions.
The almost complete absence of evidence for countercyclical real wages suggests
that movements along labor demand curves have not played a dominant role in cyclical
employment fluctuations over the last 40 years. Instead, the procyclicality of real wages
indicates that cyclical employment fluctuations have been generated mainly by shifts in
labor demand. The sources of these shifts and of the positive slope of the effective labor
supply curve, however, remain open to alternative interpretations.
Robert Barsky Gary Solon
GraduateSchool of Business Department of Economics
University of Chicago The University of Michigan
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"The older empirical work ...suggestsa null hypothesis that real wages and employment
are statistically independent over the business cycle. Our main empirical conclusion is
that it is difficult to reject this hypothesis for the 12 countries studied (and, in particular,
for the United States)."
—Gearyand Kennan (1982, P. 855)
"I find real wages to be very procycical. A percentage point rise in the unemployment
rate is associated with a decrease inreal wages of between 1.5 and 2 percent."
—Bus(1985. P. 668)
"These results suggest that recent data for the United States do offer support for the
hypothesis of the countercyclical movement of the real wage rate."
—Chirinko(1980, p. 461)
Leading macroeconomists from Keynes on have discussed the movement of real
wages over the business cycle. The cyclicality of real wages is of interest in its own right,
but more importantly it plays a major role in many theoretical models of the business
cycle. Consequently, dozens of empirical researchers have used evidence on real wage
behavior as a means of testing alternative macroeconomic theories. As the quotations
above suggest, the resulting studies have produced a bewildering array of seemingly
conflicting findings. Many studies of industry-level time series data have concluded that
real wages are noncyclical, but a few time series studies have claimed to demonstrate
countercyclicality or procyclicality, and more recent studies of longitudinal microdata
typically have produced evidence of procyclicality. Because the studies' methods differ in
so many dimensions —choiceof sample period, level of aggregation, price index, treatment
of overtime pay, dynamic specification, etc. —itis far from obvious what generates the
divergence of results.
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Our goal in this paper is to clarify the evidence on cyclical real wage behavior in
the United States since World War II. Our approach is to conduct a wide variety of
analyses motivated by a succession of alternative theories. In the process, we generate a
broad-ranging body of evidence that enables us to view what produces variations in results
and to assess whether our own results can be reconciled with each other and with results
from preceding studies. At the same time, we rely on very simple econometric methods in
order to make the sources of our results as transparent as possible. What emerges is a
surprisingly coherent account of real wage cycicality.
In Section I. we summarize macroeconomic theories that, on the basis of different
varieties of nominal wage stickiness, predict countercyclical real wages. Then we test
numerous variants of such theories with empirical analyses tailored to the particular
theories. The results, based mainly on industry time series data, show virtually no
evidence of countercvclicality. In Section 11. we consider theories that, on the basis of
labor demand shifts along positively sloped effective labor supply curves, predict
procyclical real wages. There we supplement the time series evidence with analyses of
longitudinal microdata from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The longitudinal
analyses reveal substantial procyclicality of real wages. This procycicality is obscured in
the published aggregate wage data, especially the industry-level data, because those data
are constructed in a way that gives greater weight to low-wage workers during
expansions. We then interpret our procyclicality results in terms of the cyclical upgrading
of workers across jobs. In Section III, we summarize our findings and their consistency
with each other, with previous studies, and with economic theory.
I. Are Real Wages Countercyclical?
Simple versions of major business cycle theories frequently have predicted
countercyclical real wages. The best-known example, of course, is the model in Chapter 2
of' Keynes' General Theory (1936).In that model, what happens during a recession is
that, due to downward rigidity in the nominal wage, the real wage sticks above the3
market-clearing level. Employment then is determined by the "short side" of the market
(i.e., by labor demand), and low employment and high unemployment ensue. Keynes
therefore predicted:
with a given organisation, equipment and technique, real wages and the
volume of output (and hence of employment) are uniquely correlated, so that, in
general, an increase in employment can only occur to the accompaniment of a
decline in the rate of real wages. Thus I am not disputing this vital fact which
the classical economists have rightly asserted as indefeasible. [1936, p. 17]
Similar predictions appear in early versions of equilibrium business cycle models,
in which cyclical employment fluctuations arise from workers' misperceptions of the
general price level.Friedman's presidential address to the American Economic
Association, for example, contains this description of the labor market during an
expansion:
Because selling prices of products typically respond to an unanticipated rise in
nominal demand faster than prices of factors of production. real wages received
have gone down —thoughreal wages anticipated by employees went up, since
employees implicitly evaluated the wages offered at the earlier price level.
Indeed, the simultaneous fall ex post in real wages to employers and rise ex ante
in real wages to employees is what enabled employment to increase. [1968.
p. 10]
Phelps introduction to the "Phelps volume" gives the corresponding description of a
recession:
the acceptance wage on each island will fall less than proportionally to product
prices; some workers will refuse employment at the new (lower) market-clearing
money wage rates, preferring to spend the time searching for a better relative
money wage elsewhere. Effective labor supply thus shifts leftward at every real
wage rate; real wage rates rise, and profit-maximizing output and employment
fall. [1970. p. 7]
The common feature of the Keynes and Friedman-Phelps models is that, in both, cyclical
employment fluctuations reflect movements along a labor demand curve induced by shifts
in effective labor supply as a function of the real wage. The models differ mainly in their
accounts of why the effective supply curve shifts.
Most of the many studies of post-World War II real wage data have failed to find
countercyclical real wages. This has led numerous writers to tinker with the Keynes or
Friedman-Phelps analyses, either to explain why real wages are not countercyclical or to4
explainwhy the countercyclicality is obscured in the data. The remainder of this section
develops and applies a framework for evaluating each of these explanations.
Econometric Specification
A simple statistical model for exploring the cyclicality of real wages is
(1)In W =++ + y4(Ut—61—62t—53t2)+
whereW is some aggregate real wage measure in year t, U is the civilian unemployment
rate, andis a random error term. A quadratic time trend is included in the wage
equation. and the unemployment rate is entered as a deviation from its own quadratic
trend, in order to focus on the cyclical components of wage and unemployment variation.
A countercyclical real wage would be denoted by a positive value fora procyclical real
wage by a negative value.
First.difTerencing equation (1) yields the main equation for our aggregate time
series analyses:
(2) lnW=3i + 32t +33U+ v
where v == — + 2 =2('3—-v463),and 33 = 0 as the
real wage is countercyclical, noncyclical, or procyclical. Equation (2) is precisely the same
specification used by Bus (1985) in his aggregate time series analyses, which facilitates
comparisons of our results to those of one of our closest forerunners. Another convenient
feature of equation (2), reflected in the Durbin-Watson statistics in the tables below, is that
the error term v = usually displays little serial correlation.1 This result dovetails
with the finding of numerous aggregate studied, such as Altonji and Ashenfelter (1980),
that the stochastic behavior of the log real wage resembles a random walk.2
11n addition to the small first-order autocorrelations indicated by the Durbin-Watson
statistics, correlograms of the OLS residuals display small autocorrelations at higher
orders as well.
2We have experimented with estimating equation (2) withoutany time trend and with a
quadratic time trend. These modifications have remarkably little effect on our estimates of
p33. We also have verified the robustness of our results to changes in cycle indicator, in5
Preliminary Aggregate Analyses
We begin with ordinary least squares estimation of equation (2) with highly
aggregated annual time series data for 1947—48 to 1986—87. Following BUs (1985), we
initially measure the real wage with average hourly earnings of production or
nonsupervisory workers, deflated by the implicit GNP deflator. The earnings data are
generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment survey. Details on data sources
are provided in the Appendix.
The first row of Table 1 presents results for total private nonagricultural
employment. The estimated coefficient of =— .0026,is slightly procyclical and of
marginal statistical significance. It implies that, when the unemployment rate increases
by an additional percentage point, real wage growth declines by about one-quarter of a
percentage point. This estimated magnitude of procyclicality is only about one-fifth of that
reported by Bus (1985).
As Chirinko (1980) and Huizinga (1980) have pointed out, even this mild
procyclicality might be an artifact of a composition bias in the aggregate data. The bias
arises from a fact documented by Okun (1973) and easily confirmed by a perusal of
employment tabulations by industry —thatemployment in certain high-wage industries,
particular, replacing with change in log real GNP or change in the log of the civilian
employmentipopulation ratio. Finally, it is worth noting that the t-ratio for the
relationship betweenIn W and is algebraically invariant to which variable is on
the left side of the regression equation and which is on the right.
'Bils estimates=— .0120with aggregate data for 1966—67, 1967—68, 1968—69,
1969—70, 1970—71, 1971—73. 1973—75, 1975—76, 1976—78, and 1976-80. Some of his
observations are two-year differences to maintain consistency with his microdata from the
National Longitudinal Surveys of labor market experience. We have replicated his
analysis with a more recent revision of the implicit GNP deflator series and obtained a
slightly smaller P33 =—.0104. Filling in his missing years, i.e., using one-year differences
for all years from 1966—67 to 1979—80, further reduces 33 to —.0085.Extending the
sample period to 1986—87 produces i3. =— .0062.Then extending the sample period back
to 1947—48 produces our estimate or —.0026.Bils also reports an estimate of —.0108
based on only manufacturing industries. We have found that extending his manufacturing
analysis to the period 1966—67 to 1986—87 reduces 83 to only —.0043,and extending back
to 1947—48 produces 33 =—.0021. Finally, for manufacturing wages excluding overtime,
Bils estimates 33 =— .0065.Extending this analysis to the period 1966—67 to 1986—87
produces $3 =— .0013. Extending back to 194 7-48 yields 83 =.00002.6
particularly durable goods manufacturing and construction, is especially sensitive to the
business cycle. During a recession, therefore, the reduced employment shares of these
industries produce a downward tendency in the economvwide average wage. As a result,
even if real wages were countercyclical in each industry, the economywide average might
obscure that countercyclicality and might even appear procyclical.
The remainder of Table 1 begins to address that possibility by presenting
separate results for each of nine major industry categories. The results indicate that
disaggregating by major industry does tend to reduce the estimated procyclicality of real
wages. Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of the major industry results is the absence
of substantial countercyclicality in any industry. These results are essentially an updated
replication of a long history of studies that, contrary to the predictions of the Keynes and
Friedman-Phelps models, have failed to discover countercvclical real wages.4 Proponents
of the Keynes or Friedman-Phelps models have suggested a variety of explanations for this
failure, which are discussed in turn below.
Overtime Pay
The share of overtime hours in total work hours increases during expansions. and
these hours typically are compensated with a wage premium, often "time and a half."
Lucas (1970) has argued that the procvclicality of the overtime share might account for
the failure to observe countercyclicality in real average hourly earnings. Even if
employment expansions are induced by declines in real base wages, it is possible.
depending on the production function, for those base wage reductions to lead to such
disproportionate increases in overtime hours that real average hourly earnings might
increase.
A simple way to test this hypothesis is to reestimate equation (2) with a wage
measure based on average hourly earnings excluding overtime. The first panel of Table 2
4See, for example, Bodkin (1969) and Gearv and Kennan (1982).7
presents the results of such a reestimation for durables and nondurables manufacturing,
the only major sectors for which straighttirne and overtime hours data are separately
available. Excluding overtime does move the estimates of 133 in a countercydical direction,
as it must given the procyclicality of the overtime share. But the results still do not show
significant countercycicality in real base wages. Furthermore, results for more detailed
industries, to be presented below, also fail to indicate a pattern of countercyclicality. One
other indication that real base wages are not countercycical is that, in Table 1,
countercyclicality does not appear even for sectors that make little use of overtime.
particularly services and finance/insurance/realestate.5
Price Indexes
As noted by Bodkin (1969) and Geary and Kennan t1982), if cyclical employment
fluctuations are movements along a labor demand curve, the appropriate real wage
measure is deflated by the relevant product price, not by a general consumer price index.
Indeed, the only bit of evidence for real wage couinercyclicality reported by Bodkin is for a
wage measure deflated by a producer price index.
In the second panel of Table 2, we report the results that appear when average
hourly earnings (excluding overtime) in durables and nondurables manufacturing are
deflated by the producer price indexes (PPIs) for the respective sectors. instead of by the
implicit GNP deflator. The estimate of 33 for durables becomes slightlyless
countercyclical. The estimate for nondurables is more countercyclical, but is very
imprecisely estimated. At this level of aggregation. then, deflating by PPIs produces no
clear evidence of countercyclicality, but the greater volatility of the PPIs makes accurate
estimation difficult. Further results based on PPIs for more detailed industries will be
presented below.
5See Carr (1986, Table 2) for data on overtime by industry.8
For completeness, in the third panel, we report estimates based on the consumer
price index (CPI). These are less countercyclical than those based on either of the other
types of price index.
Dynamic Specification
Neftci (1978) and Sargent (1978) have argued that, if employment adjustment is
costly, the relationship between real wage movements and movements in employment or
unemployment is not contemporaneous as in equation (2); instead, the latter movements
should lag the former. This raises the possibility that, once the dynamic nature of the
employment-wage relationship is recognized, the data might be interpretable as lying along
a labor demand curve after all.6 Bus (1985 has argued that noncontemporaneous wage-
employment relationships should be less of an issue with annual data than with the
monthly and quarterly data used respectively by Neftci and Sargent. but it still seems
worthwhile to check for dynamic relationships.
Our specification in equation (2) assumes that real wage growth is related to only
the current and once-lagged unemployment rates and that the current and lagged rates
enter with equal and opposite coefficients. The analysis reported in the first panel of Table
3 checks the equal-and-opposite restriction by including U_1 aswell as in the
regression, so that the relevant test is whether the coefficient of U_1is zero. That
restriction is clearly acceptable.
The reasoning of Neftci and Sargent suggests that current real wages might be
related to futureunemploymentrates. The second and third panels of Table 3 check this
possibility by entering first and second leads of the unemployment rate. The hypothesis of
no relationship with future unemployment rates also is clearly acceptable. The estimated
coefficients of
1in the second panel are small and statistically insignificant, and F-
6Neftci and Sargent both present evidence for lagged employmentresponses to real wag€
movements, but Geary and Kennan (1982) report that this finding can be overturnec
either by extending the sample period or by deflating by a producer instead of consumer
price index.9
tests of the hypothesis that U 1 and both have zero coefficients easily accept the
hypothesis at any conventional significance level.1
Sample Period
Thefew studies that have claimed to find inklings of countercycical real wages
have been based on data from roughly the first half of our sample period. On the other
hand, more recent studies based on microdat.a from roughly the second half of our sample
period usually have found procyclical real wages. Some writers, such as Coleman (1984)
and Kniesner and Goldsmith (1987), have attributed the supposedly different pattern in
the second period to the special role of oil price shocks in recent recessions. It therefore
seems worthwhile to examine wage cyclicality in particular subperiods.
The first panel of Table 4 presents results for 1947—48 to 1966—67. Including
observations from only the first half of the sample period does move the results in a
countercyclical direction, but the estimated countercyclicality is not substantial. The t.
ratiofor nondurables is the largest yet and is still of only marginal statistical significance.
The results for the second half of the sample period, shown in the second panel, are
remarkably noncyclical. Although differences in sample period can account for some of the
discrepancy between time series studies and microdata studies, we will argue in SectionII
that a composition bias in the time series data is a more important factor.
Multisector Models
The crucial role of nominal wage rigidity in the original Keynesian model implies
a prediction of countercyclicality in aggregate real wages. The apparent absenceof such
countercyclicality, among other things, has motivated some researchers to develop
multisector models in which some parts of the labor market are characterized by
Keynesian wage rigidity and others are not. Hall (1975), for example, has suggested that
7We obtain similar results when we reverse the regression and test for the dependence of
AUt on lagged wage variables.10
the Keynesian sector is comprised of "nonentrepreneurial" employers that are relativel
insulated from product market competition while the flexible-wage sector is inhabited b:
"entrepreneurial" employers. Ra.isian (1979) has described a similar model except that hi
sectors are distinguished by unionization instead of entrepreneurial status. In thes
models, it is possible for nominal wage rigidity in the Keynesian sector to generate cycic2
employment fluctuations, but for the count.ercycicality of real wages in the Keynesiai
sector to be masked in the economywide data.
The results in Table 1 present an immediate challenge to such theories. I
different industries are supposed to have very different cyclical wage patterns, why do ai
the major industries in Table 1 display so little real wage cyclicality? There is littl
indication in Table 1 that less entrepreneurial industries (e.g., transportation and publi
utilities) display greater nominal wage rigidity and more countercyclical real wages. No
is there much indication of that sort for more unionized industries (e.g., manufacturing
mining, and transportation and public utilities).8
To investigate sectoral differences in finer detail, we have estimated equation (2
for fifteen detailed manufacturing industries for which all the necessary data ar4
available.9 The second and third panels of Table 5 present results for average hourl:
earnings (excluding overtime) deflated respectively by the implicit GNP deflator and th4
consumer price index. Once again, there is little indication of regular cyclical patterns ii
the purchasing power of hourly wages —mostof the estimated coefficients are small an
statistically insignificant. More importantly, there is little evidence for the particula.
patterns predicted by the multisector theories.If one takes a very high four-firn
8Hall's evidence of interindustry differences inwage cyclicality is based on an annua
earnings measure that appears to confound hourly wage cyclicality with some portion o
the interindustry variation in hourscyclicality.Raisian's evidence of union.nonunio
differences is based on microdat.a for only 1967—74. Furthermore, his business cyci
indicator, the deviation of the annual unemployment rate in the individual's industry fror
its 1967—74 average, may reflect sectoral trends as well as cyclical fluctuations.
9mese analyses are based on shorter sample periods because of the limited availability c
the necessary industry PPIs and wage measures (excluding overtime).11
concentration ratio as indicative of insulation from product market competition, one might
expect highly concentrated industries to display countercyclical real wages. On the
contrary, tobacco manufactures, rubber and miscellaneous plastics products, household
appliances, and motor vehicles and equipment display strikingly noncycical real wages.
Furthermore, this noncyclicality appears despite high unionization in all four of these
industries.10 Nor is there especially strong evidence for countercyclicality in other highly
unionized, but less concentrated industries (e.g., paper and allied products, cement-
hydraulic, and blast furnaces and steel mills). Additional evidence based on microdata, to
be presented in Section fl, also fails to corroborate a union-nonunion difference in wage
cyclic ality.''
The last panel of Table 5 presents results based on deflating wages by industry-
specific PPIs instead of by general. price indexes. The resulting coefficient estimates
become larger in magnitude, but diverge from zero in different directions for different
industries. It is important to recognize that the changes in results from the earlier panels
to the last must reflect interindustry differences in the cyclicality of relative product prices,
not in the cyclicality of the purchasing power of workers' wages. Indeed, one can infer the
direction of cyclicality of relative product prices by observing the sign of the change in
coefficient estimates from the earlier panels to the last.'2 It is noticeable that, with the
exception of lumber and wood products, the only industries in the table estimated to have
procyclical relative prices are unconcentrated nondurables industries —dairyproducts,
men's and bovs shirts and nightwear, and footwear except rubber. In accordance with a
hypothesis in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), durable goods industries show a
'0See Freeman and Medoff (1979) for unionization rates by industry.
"Pencavel and Hartsog's (1984) time series study also fails to find clear-cut evidence for a
countercyclical union-nonunion wage gap.
'2The last panel givesesnates of .In(NtfPt) associated with an unemployment rate
change, where N.t is the iindustry's nominal wage and P is its PPI. The earlier panels
give estimates o? ln (N,1P) whereis a general price index. The difference between
these two expressions is simptly the change in the log of the relative product price a1t12
pronounced tendency toward countercyclicality in relative product prices. The sam'
applies for concentrated industries, including those in the nondurables sector (tobacc'
manufactures, chemicals and allied products, and rubber and miscellaneous plastic:
products). This is consistent with Rotemberg and Saloner's (1986) hypothesis tha
oligopolistic industries tend to enter price wars during expansions.
Finally, the results in Table 5 are informative about one other Keynesiar
explanation of the apparent noncyclicality of real wages —that,although nominal rigidit
plays a key role in cyclical employment fluctuations. fixed markups of product prices over
wage costs might maintain noncyclicality in the wage/price ratio. Hall and Taylor (1 9S6
p. 395), for example. note the apparent noncyclicality of real wages and then claim. "Thi
stability is a reflection of the markup pricing strategies." The trouble with thir
explanation is that it impliesnoncyclicality, not in the purchasing power of workers' wage'
by industry, but in workers' own-product wages. One could just as well read Table 5
however, to suggest that, although the purchasing power of industry wages shows littk
cyclicality. the markup of product prices over wages does vary cyclically in different ways
for different industries.
Summary
Our analysis of U.S. post-World War II time series data has accumulated t
preponderanceof evidence that industry real wages, relative to general price indexes.
appear more or less noncyclical (although industry product wages may follow variow
cyclical patterns due to cyclicality in relative product prices). We have found hardly 2
shredof evidence to support either the original or modified versions of either the Keynes ot
Friedman-Phelps theories of cyclical employment fluctuations as a consequence of nomina
wage stickiness. Our evidence against real wage countercyclicality will be strengthened b
our finding in the next section that the industry time series data are subject to a sizabk
countercyclical bias.13
These findings in no way deny that labor demand curves slope downward or that
unanticipated price shocks ever shift employment along labor demand curves in industries
with nominally rigid wages.13 What they do deny is that such shifts have played a
dominant role in cyclical employment movements in the U.S. over the last 40 years.
II. Are Real Wages Procyclical?
Theories that predict countercycical real wages interpret cyclical employment
fluctuations as the consequence of shifts in effective labor supply. Theories based instead
on shifts in labor demand predict pr'ocyclical real wages. These shifts in labor demand
might arise either from technological or other productivity innovations, as in real business
cycle models, or from changes in output demand induced by nominal disturbances, as in
some Keynesian and monetarist models.
In either case, employment expansions resulting from labor demand shifts should
be associated with rises in real average hourly earnings. At the intensive margin, the
employment increase typically is comprised partly of an increase in overtime hours, which
command a wage premium. At the extensive margin, employers should bid up the real
base wage as they attempt to attract additional workers. These efforts will lead to an
increase in aggregate employment only if the short-run aggregate labor supply function is
positively sloped. Lucas and Rapping's (1969) model of intertemporal substitution in labor
supply provides a theoretical basis for expecting the slope of the short-run labor supply
curve to be positive)4 If it is, a rightward shift in the labor demand function leads to
increases in both employment and the real wage. Thus, for example, in Barro and King's
intertemporal substitution model:
13Card (1988) finds evidence for such shifts in data on unionized Canadian employers.
14As Hall (1988) notes, efficiency wage models give an alternative basis for a positively
sloped effective labor supply curve. One can characterize those models as having relabeled
the positively sloped curve in the wage-employment diagram as a "no-shirking condition."14
the real wage, which equals the marginal product of labor, must rise along with
the increases in output and work effort. In other words, a procyclical pattern for
the real wage is central to our theoretical analysis. [1984, p. 833]
Of course, the theoretical prediction of procyclicality in real wages seems to be at
odds with much empirical evidence of noncyclicality, including the results presented in
Section I. In response, some writers, including Barro and King (1984, p. 833) and Lucas
(1977, p. 17), have attempted to explain the apparent noncycicality of real wages by
reference to implicit contract theories of real wage smoothing in long-term employment
relationships. This might be an adequate explanation if most of the cyclical variation in
employment and unemployment were at the quasi-intensive margin of temporarily laying
off and recalling workers with permanent attachments to their employers. But the strong
procyclicality of new hire rates and the predominant role of permanent layoffs in cyclical
unemployment suggest that a large portion of cyclical employment variation occurs at the
extensive margin.15 The point remains that employers should have to offer higher real
wages during an expansion to attract more new workers.
A second explanation, suggested by Stockman (1983), is that the aggregate time
series data contain a countercycical composition bias that obscures the true procycicality
of real wages. The published aggregate data on average hourly earnings are constructed




where i indexes individual workers, H.t is the th worker's hours of work in year t, Wt is
N
the i workers average hourly earnings, and H =H.As the second version of
equation (3) makes clear, the published aggregate average hourly earnings variables are
15See Lilien and Hall (1986).15
weighted averages of individuals' average hourly earnings, where the weights are the
individuals' shares of total work hours. If the hours shares of high- and low-wage workers
vary cyclically, this will induce a compositional cyclicality in the aggregate wage measure
that is unrelated to the cyclical wage variation faced by individual workers. In particular,
Clark and Summers (1981), Okun (1973), Mitchell, Wallace, and Warner (1985). and
Kydland (1984), among others, have documented the greater cyclical sensitivity of
employment for workers in low-wage demographic groups and education categories. Thus,
low-wage workers tend to receive less weight in economywide aggregate wage data during
a recession and more during an expansion. Moreover, if there is countercyclicality in
worker quality by industry, as is also documented by Okun, a similar compositional effect
applies to industry aggregate wage measures. Because these compositional effects bias
aggregate wage measures in a countercyclical direction, they might account for the
weakness of the evidence for procyclicality in aggregate wage data.
To avoid the composition bias in aggregate data, several researchers, including
Stockman (1983) and Bus (1985), have reexamined the cyclicality of real wages with
microdata from longitudinal surveys.16 With such data, it becomes possible to investigate
cyclical patterns in individuaLs' real wages and therefore to avoid the obfuscating factor of
composition changes. In accordance with Stockman's conjecture, most studies following
this strategy have found strong evidence of procyclicality in real wages. In the remainder
of this section, we imitate this strategy with a new analysis of microdata from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, and we then proceed to explore the labor market processes
underlying the divergences between the evidence from microdata and aggregate data.
Description of Data
Our microdat.a come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a
longitudinal survey that has collected data on members of the same families every year
16Other studies of this type include Coleman (1984), Mather (1987), and Keane, Moffltt,
and Runkle (1988).16
since 1968. Our sample is drawn from the PSID's 1985 cross-year family-individual
response file. We restrict our sample to male household heads born between 1925 and
1942 who reported positive annual hours of work and labor income for every year from
1967 to 1984. (The hours and income questions pertain to the calendar year preceding the
interview. The birth year restriction assures that the sample members are between the
ages of 25 and 59 throughout the sample period.) We exclude the Survey of Economic
Opportunity portion of the PSID, which overrepresents the low-income population. The
resulting sample contains 18 years of data for each of 357 men. Our measure of an
individual's hourly wage rate in a given year is simply the ratio of his annual labor income
to his annual hours of work. A more detailed data description is provided in the Appendix.
Preliminary Analyses
For comparison purposes, we begin with some results based on Section I's
aggregate wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) establishment survey. In
the first panel of Table 6, we rewrite the estimates of 83fromthe first three rows of Table
1. These are the coefficient estimates for from the regressions in which the
dependent variables are the changes in the log payrolllhours ratios for durable goods
manufacturing, nondurable goods manufacturing, and total private nonagricultural
employment from 1947—48 to 1986—87. Then, for temporal comparability with our PSID
data, in the second panel we report the results from reestimating these regressions with
the BLS data for 1967—68 to 1983—84. The BLS results in Table 6 recall two points from
Section I. First, as in Table 4, restricting the sample period to more recent years moves
the results in a procyclical direction. Second, the total private nonagricultural wage
measure displays more procyclicality than do the industry-specific measures because of the
procyclicality in the employment shares of the high-paying durable goods manufacturing
17We also have experimented with excluding men that were exclusively self-employed in
any year and have found that this exclusion has virtually no effect on the results reported
below.17
and construction sectors. In the context of Section I's analysis of theories in which cyclical
employment fluctuations represent movements along negatively sloped industry labor
demand curves, this aggregation effect threatened to obscure the real wage
countercyclicality we were attempting to verify. But, in the context of the present section,
in which we are assessing theories involving employment variations along positively sloped
labor supply curves, the greater opportunities workers have during expansions to upgrade
into higher-paying industries comprise a genuine form of procycicality in workers' real
wages. In this setting, then, the broader wage measureis the more revealing statistic.
Nevertheless, even the total private nonagricultural payroll/hours ratio is an
hours-weighted average of individuals' wages and is susceptible to Stockman's
countercyclical composition bias.'8 In contrast, our PSID data,whichfollow the same
prime-age men over time, enable the construction of wage measures free of such bias.
Simply restricting the sample to prime-age men avoids bias from cyclical changes in the
hours shares of non-prime-age and female workers. Furthermore, access to data on
individuals wages permits the calculation of unweighted averages of the individuals' wages.
Indeed, reestimating equation (2) with the PSID data does produce dramatically
more procyclical estimates. As shown in the fourth row of Table 6, using the unweighted
average of the sample individuals' log wages more than doubles the estimatedcoefficient of
to 3 =— .0126.To check that this increase in estimated procyclicality comes from
avoiding composition bias, rather than from using the average of a log instead of the log of
an average, in the fifth row we use the log of the unweighted average wage.This raises
the estimated procydicality still further to=— .0137. Table 7, which displays our
PSID sample's average log real wages and log average real wages by year, clarifies the
basis of our regression results. Examination of the table makes plain that real wage
growth was unusually low in recession years.
181n addition, the BLS measures are restricted to production or nonsupervisory workers
and therefore do not capture procyclicality in opportunities to advance out of production
and nonsupervisory jobs.18
To highlight the importance of the hours-weighting issue, in the last row of Table
6 we report the results of a mischievous exercise. We injectacomposition bias into our
PSID data by calculating the ratio of total earnings to total hours in our sample; that is,
we deliberately compute an hours-weighted average wage similar in construction to the
BLS measures. Although our PSID version of this variable is still free of composition bias
from cycicality in the hours shares of non-prime-age and female workers, introducing
hours-weighting among the prime-age men in our sample dramatically reduces t3., to
—.0078.Because both the weighted and unweighted estimates ofare based on the
same individual observations, the discrepancy between the estimates arises entirely from
the differential cyclicality of hours between high-wage and low-wage workers. Indeed, the
result in equation (9) of Bus (1985) shows that 100 times this discrepancy directly
estimates the proportional shortfall of the average wage for a cyclically marginal hour
relative to the average wage for an hour that is worked regardless of the stage of the
business cycle. Our results therefore imply that, among prime-age men. cyclically
marginal hours are paid at only about half the rate of nonmarginal hours.'9 Bus reports
a smaller shortfall, about 20 percent, among the very young men in his sample.
A simple method for interpreting the magnitude of our estimates of 133 is based on
the observation that is a slightly damped approximation for 100 times the negative
change in the log of the ernploymentipopulation ratio.2° Hence, —10033 can be regarded
as a crude estimate of the inverse elasticity of the short-run aggregate labor supply curve.
Our estimate in the fourth row of Table 6,=— .0126, therefore implies a labor supply
elasticity of 1/1.26.79. Similarly, in the regression with on the left side of the
equation and iinW on the right, the estimated coefficient of ln W divided by 100 can
be regarded as a crude estimate of the labor supply elasticity itself. Least squares
'9A very similar result is reported in Prescott (1986,p. 32).
20The damping arises from the moderate procycicality of the labor forceparticipation rate.
Change in log employment, in turn, is a damped version of change in log hours.19
estimation of this reversed regression produces an estimated labor supply elasticity of
3721Thus,given the degree of real wage procycicality we have estimated, it is possible
to rationalize observed cyclical employment fluctuations as labor supply responses to
cyclical wage movements on the basis of short-run labor supply elasticities less than unity.
Nevertheless, in Section III, we will question whether this is a completely satisfactory
interpretation of the data.
It may be worthwhile to compare our results to those of Bils (1985), whose study
of microdata from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of young men also was
motivated by the Stockman hypothesis that aggregate real wage data are contaminated by
cyclical changes in the composition of the work force. Although Bus' evidence from
microdata suggests strong procyclicality in real wages, so does his evidence from aggregate
hours-weighted measures. He therefore concludes that composition bias is relatively
unimportant.22 In footnote 2, however, we have demonstrated that Bils' unusual finding
of strong procyclicality in aggregate real wage measures is an artifact of the particular ten
observations he uses. Nevertheless, we have found that, even in a more typical period
with less procyclicality in aggregate real wage measures, the microdata still display a
statistically and substantively significant degree of procyclicality.
Sample Selection Bias
Before proceeding to more detailed analyses, we need to address the question of
whether our results are somehow a spurious reflection of our sample selection criteria. In
particular, one might reasonably be concerned about the restriction of our sample to men
21Leamer (1981) discusses conditions under which the probability limits of the two
elasticity estimators bound the true elasticity. Using change in the log of the employment!
population ratio in place of changes the estimates .79 and .37 respectively to 1.05 and
.46.
22See, in particular, page 684 of Bus' article. Similarly, the survey article by Kniesner
and Goldsmith (1987, p. 1257) declares that "sample composition effects are empirically
unimportant for this issue." In fact, although Bus' estimates from aggregate BLS data are
strongly procyclical, his estimates from NLS microdat.a are substantially more so.20
employed in all 18 years of the sample period. Such a concern about the endogeneity of
employment status has led Bils (1985) and Keane, Moffitt, and Runkle (1988) to attempt
elaborate corrections for sample selection bias.
There are two reasons why we doubt the importance of sample selection bias in
our own analysis. First, our wage measure is an annual average, unlike the NLS point-in.
time measures used by Bils and by Keane, Moffltt, and Runkle. Therefore, to be excluded
from our sample because of nonemployment. an individual must be nonemployed for an
entire calendar year. For the prime-age male population analyzed in our study,
nonemployment for an entire calendar year is a considerably less likely occurrence than
nonemplovment in a particular reference week.23
Second, we have been unable toconcocta plausible structural model that would
account for spuriously procyclical real wage patterns. For example, if one believes that
periods of prolonged nonemployrnent reflect labor supply responses to transitorily low real
wage opportunities, then our exclusion of such observations would bias our analysis toward
understating the procyclicality of real wages. On the other hand, if one believes any of the
sticky-nominal-wage theories tested in Section I, our exclusion of individuals unemployed
because their real wages were too high would bias our analysis in the procyclical direction
of understating the true countercyclicality of real wages. But, setting aside the almost
complete absence of evidence for such theories, these theories still do not explain why the
individuals remaining in our sample display strongly procyclical real wages.
Detailed Analyses
To facilitate more detailed analyses of the PSID data, we adopt the following
statistical model for individuals' real wage rates:
(4) InW =i+y2t+.Y3t2+.v4(TJt_bi 62t—
231n total, 83 men are excluded fromour sample because they had zero earnings in some
year. The zero-earnings observations appear to arise mainly from disability, retirement,
and nonpositive income from self-employment, rather than from unemployment.21
where W1 is the 1th worker's real wage in year t, U again is the civilian unemployment
rate, Z is a vector of time-invariant worker characteristics such as race and years of
education, X1isthe worker's years of work experience as of year t, andis a random
error term. Equation (4) extends the standard log earnings function, popularized by
Mincer (1974), to incorporate the general time trend and business cycle regressors from
equation (1). First-differencing equation (4) yields
(5) In W1 =
where=&it2 =2(y3—i4ö3)as in equation (2),=
encompasses real wage growth due to the accumulation of individual experience as well as
general time trends, 34 =27<0 reflects the concavity of the log wage/experience profile.
and again 33 = 0as the real wage is countercyclical, noncyclical, or procyclical.
First, we perform ordinary least squares estimation of equation (5) with our
sample of 6,069 PSID observations (17 year-to-year changes for each of 357 men). The
resulting coefficient estimate for 83 =— .0126, is shown in the first column of Table
S. This estimate is identical to the one based on the aggregated PSID log wage data, as
reported in the fourth row of Table 6. The two estimates are necessarily equal because
the only regressor in equation (5) that varies cross-sectionally, the work experience
variable is perfectly correlated in the intertemporal dimension with t. Consequently,
the only difference between the two regressions is that the time variable in the aggregate
regression picks up both the general time effect and the effect of the aging of the sample
cohort.
It is important to note, though, that the standard error estimate in Table 8 is only
.0031, as compared to .0036 in Table 6. The estimate in Table S is biased downward by
its neglect of the cross-sectional and serial dependence of the error term v. As discussed
by Coleman (1986), is cross-sectionally correlated because different workers' error
terms share common time effects. In addition, an analysis of serial correlation in the OLS
residuals estimates that v1, which is the first difference of EIt,hasa first-order22
autocorrelationof —.39and higher-order autocorrelations close to zero.24Accounting for
both types of dependenceinv1 wouldrequirea complicated generalized least squares
procedure, which we have not undertaken. Instead, we merely emphasize that, basedon
the comparison of corresponding results in Tables 6 and 8, the standarderror estimates in
Table 8 appear to be biased downward by about 15 percent.
Our first detailed analysis returns to the question of whether unionwages are less
procyclical than nonunion wages, as discussed in Section I. Here we add to equation (4)a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the worker is a union member in the relevantyear along
with interactions of that variable with time, time squared, and theunemployment rate
variable. Then we estimate the first-differenced form of theexpanded equation. The
coefficient of reflects the cyclicality of the real wage for nonunion workers, and the
coefficient of the change in the interaction of the unemploymentrate with the union
dummy reflects the incremental cyclicality for union workers. As shown in the second
column of Table 8, the estimated coefficient of is —.0114 for nonunion workers and
—.0114 —.0052 =—.0166for union workers. Thus, real wages are estimated to bemore
procyclical for union workers, but, as indicated by the small t-ratio for the interaction
term, the estimated union-nonunion contrast is statisticallyinsignificant. In short, the
sm microdata, like the aggregate data in Section I.provide no support for the hypothesis
of a countercyclical union-nonunionwage gap.
Another important contrast is between workers thatchange employers and those
that do not. Bils (1985) reports that thestrong real wage procyclicality that he finds in his
sample of young men from the .NLS is heavily concentratedamong those that change
employers. Replicating his analysis with the PSID isproblematic because the various
definitions of job tenure used in the PSIDover the years make it difficult to infer who
24Simijar results arereported in MaCurdy (1982) and Topel (1987). The negligible higher.
order autocorrelations support the omission ofindividual-specific intercepts from equation (5). If "fixed effects" inwage growth were empirically important, they would contribute
toward positive autocorrelations at all lags.23
changed employers when. Nevertheless, we try two approaches. First, because of the
well-known large difference in employer attachment between young and mature men,25
we simply add to equation (5) an interaction of the change in the unemployment rate with
a dummy variable that equals 1 when the worker is at least 35 yearsold.26 If real wage
procyclicality is concentrated among employer-changers, one might expect less
procycicality for the older workers. As shown in the third column of Table 8, the older
workers are estimated to have slightly less procyclical real wages, but the estimated
difference is small and statistically insignificant.
Second. we borrow the complex algorithm described in Appendix 2 of Altonji and
Shakotko (1985) that uses the various tenure variables in the PSID to impute tenure with
employer for every year.2' Then we adopt a very conservative standard for classifying a
wàrker as a "stayer" —heis counted as having stayed with the same employer between
years t-1 and t if his employer tenure variable equals atleast 1 year in t-1, at least 1.5 in
t, and at least 2 in t+ 1. Having assured that those classified as "stayers"almost
certainly are true stayers, we then create a dummy variable that equals 0 for those
classified as "stayers" and 1 otherwise. We loosely refer to those with a dummy value of
1 as "changers," but really they are "not-necessarily-stayers." We add this dummy
variable and its interaction with change in the unemployment rate to equation (5). The
coefficient of then reflects the cyclicality of the real wage for "stayers," and the
coefficient of the interaction term reflects the incremental cyclicality for "changers." As
shown in the fourth column of Table 8, the estimated real wage procyclicality for "stayers"
is nearly identical to that for the full sample, and the additional procyclicality estimatedfor
"changers" is small and statistically insignificant.
25See Hall (1982), especially Table 7.
26More precisely, the dummy variable equals 1 for the yeartoyear change from t 1 to t if
t minus the worker's birth year is at least 35.
2We thank Joseph Altonji for his extraordinary helpfulness in sharing this algorithm.24
Thus, neither of our approaches to this issue substantiates the hypothesis that
real wages are less procycicai for workers that stay with the same employer. In the next
subsection, we suggest an interpretation that accounts for this discrepancy between our
findings and Bils', as well as for many other patterns in our results.
An Interpretation
Our empirical analysis has found that (1) industry average real wages are more
or less noncycical, while economywide average real wages are moderately procyclical,
(2) individual workers' real wages are decidedly procyclical, and (3) the procyclicalitv of
real wages is about as pronounced for workers that stay with the same employer as for
workers that do not. Here we attempt a description of wage and employment
determination that is consistent with all three findings.
The starting point is that firms' real wage structures are sticky. Over the years,
many observers of employer practices —suchas Reder (1955), Hildebrand (1963),
Doeringer and Piore (1971),andHall (1974) —havecommented on the apparent
reluctance of employers to adjust their wage structures in response to short-term demand
fluctuations, even when they do adjust their employment levels. This phenomenon, of
course, is the empirical premise of the theoretical literature on implicit contracts.28 These
same observers, however, have noted an additional phenomenon not reflected in the
implicit contracts literature —thatemployers typically implement employment changes,
beyond those accomplished by temporary layoffs and recalls, through adjustments in hiring
and promotion standards. For example, in Reder's words:
28Harts survey of that literature begins:
The theory of implicit contracts ...wasdeveloped in order to explain the observation
that cyclical fluctuations in output are associated with large amounts of employment
variability and only small amounts of (real) wage variability. The theory is based
on the idea that it is optimal for less risk-averse firms to insure more risk-averse
workers against fluctuations in the marginal (revenue) product of labour by offering
them a sticky (real) wage. [1983, p. 3125
Quality variations in labor markets arise through upgrading and downgrading
of members of the labor force relative to the jobs they are to fill. When applicants
become scarce, employers tend to lower the minimum standards upon which they
insist as a condition for hinng a worker to fill a particular job —andvice versa
when applicants become plentiful. [1955, P. 834]
In Halls more formalistic language:
suppose that there are M grades of workers, indexed by i, and N categories of
jobs, indexed by j. Then I define c(j) as the grade of worker having a comparative
advantage in job category j
The scale wage is determined bureaucratically. If it is set correctly, workers
with a comparative advantage in category j are hired into it. and the effective
wage is the same as the scale wage. If the labor market is unexpectedly tight,
workers hired into job j will be of lower grade than c(j), but they will be paid the
scale wage for job j. The effective wage will exceed the scale wage as a
consequence of the upgrading of the labor force within the job structure. In
unexpectedly slack markets the opposite happens and the effective wage falls
short of the scale wage. Mobility brings about movements in the effective cost of
labor in the short run even though the scale wage is rigid. [1974, pp. 348—49]
This account of how employers respond to short-term fluctuations has received
little attention in the recent theoretical literature, although Okun (1981) gives an informal
discussion. Nor has it received a rigorous empirical treatment. Nevertheless, it is
remarkably consistent with all of our empirical findings. If the firms in an industry do not
adjust their real wage structures over the business cycle (and if the proportional allocation
of employment between upper- arid lower-level jobs is not markedly cyclical), then average
real wages by industry will be approximately noncycical.29 At the same time, the
previously-noted procyclicality of the employment shares of durable goods manufacturing
and construction will produce some procycicality in the economywide average real wage.
Furthermore, the procyclicality in workers' opportunities to upgrade to better jobs, both
within firms and across firms and industries, will cause individual workers' real wages to
be substantially procyclical. Finally, if many of the upgrading opportunities are within
firms, this procyclicality will pertain to workers that stay with the same employer as well
as to changers.
29The same argument applies to average industry wages over the seasonal cycle. Indeed,
Barsky and Miron (forthcoming) find little seasonal cyclicality in the average real wage in
manufacturing.26
To illustrate the argument more concretely, consider the simple example in Taoie
9. One hundredpotentialworkers are employed in either a high-wage or low-wage
industry or are not employed. In the initial period, 40 workers are employed in the higb-
wageindustry and are evenly divided between a $12-an-hour entry-level job and a $20 job.
Another 40 are in the low-wage industry, evenly divided between a $6 entry-level job and
a $10 job. The other 20 are not employed. The average wage in the high-wage industry is
$16, the average in the low-wage industry is $8, and the average for all 80 employed
workers is $12.
In the expansion period, employers in the high-wage industry increase
employment in both their job levels by 10%. while employers in the low-wage industry
increase employment in both their job levels by 5%. The different growth rates are
intended to represent the greater cyclical sensitivity of employment in certain high-wage
industries, as discussed earlier. Neither industry's employers change real wages at any job
level.Instead,in accordance with the upgrading process described above, they merely adjust
their promotion and hiring rates. In particular, the high-wage industry fills the two new
$20 openings by promoting two workers from the $12 level, and then fills the four
openings at the $12 level (including the two vacancies resulting from the promotions) by
hiring four new workers away from $10 jobs in the low-wage industry. In turn, the low-
wage industry fills its five $10 openings (including the four vacancies resulting from
departures to the other industry) by promotion from the $6 level, and hires six new
workers at the $6 level from the ranks of the nonemployed.
This stylized example of cyclical upgrading exhibits the main empirical features of
real wage cyclicality. First, average real wages are noncyclical in both industries,
remaining respectively at $16 and $8 (though. as noted in the Hall quotation, effective
—i.e.,worker.quality-adjusted —realwages would be procyclical). Because of the
increased employment share of the high-wage industry, however, the economywide
average wage has increased from $12$12.09. This, of course, corresponds to the27
moderate procycicality observed in the aggregate wage data for total private
nonagricultural employment.
Second, because of the promotion opportunities both within and between
industries, individual workers wages are quite procyclical. Among the 80 workers
employed in the initial period, the average wage has grown from $12 to $12.55. At the
same time, six workers previously not employed have been attracted to $6 jobs. Of course,
it is the averaging-in of these new low-wage workers that produces Stockman's
countercycical composition bias in the economywide average wage.
Finally, the procyclicality of individual workers' real wages is not confined to
workers that change employers. Stayers' real wages also are procyclical because their
chances of promotion are better during an expansion. It is natural that this procyclicality
of stayers' real wages would be most evident in a data set such as ours, which is
dominated by prime-age men. These workers typically have established matches with
their long-term employers and achieve most of their career advances within firms. In
contrast, for workers new to the labor market, such as Bus' sample of young men from the
NLS,advancesmore frequently take the form of employer changes as the young workers
search for better matches.
III. Summary and Discussion
We have attempted a thorough examination of cyclical real wage patterns in the
United States since World War H. In Section I, we have considered the prediction of
count.ercyclical real wages that arises from business cycle theories premised on nominal
wage stickiness. Like most previous aggregate studies, we find very little evidence of
countercyclicality in aggregate industry real wage data. This result becomes more
impressive in light of our findings in Section II that the implicit hours-weighting in the
aggregate data biases Section I's results in a countercyclical direction.
In Section II, we have considered theories that view cyclical employment
fluctuations as the consequence of labor demand shifts (generated by either real or nominal28
disturbances) along a positively sloped short-run labor supply curve. These theories
predict procyclical real wages. Our analysis of longitudinal microdat.afrom the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics suggests that real wages are indeed quite procyclical. Unlike
some recent articles, we conclude that the greater procyclicality in themicrodata analysis
stems mainly from avoidance of the bias from hours-weighting, not fromthe choice of
sample period. Also, we find that the procyclicality of real wages is about as strongfor
prime-age male workers that stay with the same employer as forthose that change
employers. We have proposed an interpretation of these results that involves stickinessin
employers' real wage structures, but cyclical variation in their hiring and promotion
standards. This interpretation accounts simultaneously for the noncyclicality of real wages
in industry average data. the moderate procyclicality in economywide average data, and
the strong procyclicality in individual worker data. We believe that further empirical and
theoretical research in this area might be especially fruitful.
An important question is whether the evidence that workers' real wages are
strongly procyclical should be viewed as corroboration of intertemporal substitution models
of the business cycle. We certainty cannot settle the debate over these models, but we can
contribute some comments. First, our results on the importance of the hours-weighting
bias in aggregate wage measures discredit the use of those measures for testing
intertemporal substitution models. Because aggregate real wage measures obscure the
true procyclicality of workers' real wages, studies based on such measures inevitably find
it difficult to reconcile the small measured cyclical variability in real wages with large
cyclical fluctuations in employment.30
Second, whether procyclical real wages reflect intertemporal substitution in labor
supply depends crucially on whether the workers that receive higher real wages during an
expansion are the same ones that work more hours. One interpretation of the recent
literature based on longitudinal analysis of earnings and hours microdata is that the two
30
See,for example, Altonji and Ashenfelter (.1980) and Kennan (1988).29
groups of workers do not match up very closely. Abowd and Card (1987, P. 51), f
example, conclude that "a simple interpretation of the data is that earnings and hou
vary at fixed hourly [real] wage rates."31
The weak empirical association between real wage changes and hours changes
the individual-worker level may become more understandable if we return to ot
distinction between workers that stay with the same employer and those that change. Fc
stayers, one source of cyclical hours variation is the procycicality of overtime hours, whic
necessarily generates some procyclicality in real wages. Of course, it is possible
interpret the wage premium for overtime as an inducement for intertemporal substitutic
in labor supply (see Lucas 1970).but overtimedoes not appear to be the major source
real wage procyclicality for stayers.32 The other obvious source of cyclical houi
variation for stayers is cyclicality in temporary layoffs and recalls. We find it implausib
that this type of hours variation is a labor supply response to cyclical real wa
adjustments.33 Our own conjecture, discussed at the end of Section II, is that ti
procyclicality of stayers' real wages mainly reflects promotions up job ladders, which ne
not involve any hours changes at all.
Similarly, for employed workers that switch firms, the procyclicality of real wag
may reflect cyclicality in opportunities for across-firm career advancement, which aga
OlSee also MaCurdy (1981), Altonji (1986), Ham (1986), and the survey article
Ashenfelter (1984).
320ne simple way to see this is to note that the large increase in estimated procyclicali
between the first two and the fourth and fifth rows of Table 6 cannot have anything to
with overtime because all the wage measures in the table contain overtime. Also, we ha
estimated the cyclicality of the overtime hours share in manufacturing, which presumab
overstates the economywide cycicality, and have found that even manufacturing
overtime cvclicality can account for at most one-quarter of the procyclicality we ha
estimated for real wages.
33mis observation, however, begs the question of whether such employer-determin
hours changes efficiently internalize workers' shadow value of time. Research on tF
important question has been initiated in several recent studies of employment and wa
determination in particular unionized settings. See, for example, Brown and Ashenfelt
(1986), MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), and Card (1988).30
need not involve hours changes. But, for changers shifting between nonemployment
employment, there is a virtually t.autological sense in which their hours changes ,nur
reflect intertemporal labor supply behavior. A previously nonemployed individual th
takes a newly available job during an expansion has revealed a willingness to work at timt
job's wage and an unwillingness to work at whatever was previously his best available
wage opportunity. Of course, this sort of wage-hours association is not evident in
empirical analyses of longitudinal data because the wage opportunities of the nonemployed
are not observed. As noted by Lucas (1978), whether one characterizes this aspect of
hours and wage cyclicality in the jargon of intertemporal labor supply behavior or in the
jargon of involuntary unemployment is not itself of paramount importance. The crucial,
and still unresolved, issue is what causes the cyclical variation in employment
opportunities.31
Table 1
Results for Average Hourly Earnings Deflated by
Implicit GNP Deflator, Major Industries, 1947-48 to 1986-87
Durbin.Watson
statistic











Transportation & —.0030 1.42
public utilities* (.0030)
Wholesale trade —.0005 1.78
(.0015)
Retail trade —.0012 2.08
(.0017)
Finance, insurance, —.0005 1.11
& real estate (.0022)
Services* —.0030 1.26
(.0024)
Numbers in parentheses are standard error estimates.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Subperiod Results for Average Hourly Earnings
Excluding Overtime, Deflated by Implicit GNP Deflator,
Durables and Nondurables Manufacturing














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PSID Sample's Average Wage Measures, Deflated by
Implicit GNP Deflator (1982 Dollars), by Year




















Coefficient Estimates from PSID Wage Data
Deflated by Implicit GNPDeflator,1967-68 to 1983_84*









See text for discussion of downward bias in standard error estimates, which appear in
parentheses.
*The results in the second and fourth columns are for 196S—69 to 1983—84 because of
the unavailability of union status and job tenure measures for 1967. The coefficient





































































































































































































































Civilian unemployment rate and employment/population ratio: Economic Report of
the President, 1988, Table B32.
Real GNP: Economic Report of the President, 1988, Table B.2.
Implicit GNP deflator: Economic Report of the President, 1988, Table B.3.
Consumer price index: Economic Report of the President, 1988, Table B-58.
Producer price indexes: The PPIs for durable goods and nondurable goods
manufacturing come from Handbook of Labor Statistics. 1975, Table 133, for 1947—59;
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1985, Table 113, for 1960—83; Supplements to Producer Price
Indexes, 1984—85, Table 2, for 1984—85; and Monthly Labor Review, February 1988, Table
34, for 1986—87. The PPIs for the detailed industries other than mens and boys' shirts
and nightwear, cement-hydraulic, and blast furnaces and steel mills come from Handbook
of Labor Statistics, 1975, Table 132, for 1956—59; Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1985,
Table 112, for 1960—83; and Supplements to Producer Price Indexes, 1984—86, Table 4,for
1984—86. The PPIs for men's and boys' shirts and nightwear, cement-hydraulic. and blast
furnaces and steel mills come from Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1975, Table 135, for
1957—58; Handbook of Labor Statistics. 1985, Table 114, for 1959—82; and Supplements to
Producer Price Indexes, 1983—86, Table 3, for 1983—86. Because these three industries'
published PPIs for 1983—86 are relative to a different base year than are their published
PPIs for earlier years, it is necessary to splice the series. The required information comes
from Supplement to Producer Price Indexes, 1982, Table 3, and Producer Price Indexes,
June 1983, Table 9.
Average hourly earnings:Average hourly earnings of production or
nonsupervisory workers in total private nonagricultural employment and by major
industry come from Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1975, Table 98, for 1947—63 and
Employment and Earnings, April 1988, Table C-i, for 1964—87. Average hourly earnings41
excluding overtime in durables and nondurables manufacturing and in two-digit industries
come from Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1975, Table 101, for 1947—59 and Handbook of
LaborStatistics,1985, Table 77, for 1960—83. For 1984—87 (1984—86 for two-digit
industries), average hourly earnings excluding overtime are imputed from the formiija
W/U+(OTH)] whereW is average hourly earnings (including overtime), H is average
weekly hours, and 0 is average weekly overtime hours. This is the same formula used by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics to construct its published series on average hourly earnings
excluding overtime. The data on W, H, and 0 for durables and nondurables
manufacturing come from Employment and Earnings, January 1988, Table 65, and the
data for two-digit industries come from Supplement to Employment and Earnings, July
1987. Average hourly earnings excluding overtime in three-and four-digit industries are
imputed in the same manner from data in Employment and Earnings, United States, 1909-
78 for 1956—76; Supplement to Employment and Earnings, July 1984. for 1977—82; and
Supplement to Employment and Earnings, July 1987, for 1983—86.
1967 four-firm concentration ratios: The ratios for two-digit industries are drawr
from R.otemberg and Saloner (1986, Table 2). The ratios for four-digit industries com€
from Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, 1977 Census of Manufactures, Table 7. Thi
ratios for three-digit industries are constructed from the same source by the sam
averaging procedure described in Rotemberg and Saloner.
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Our data are drawn from the 1985 cross-year family-individual response file
which is documented in A Panel Study of Income Dynamics: Procedures and Tape Codes
1985 Interviewing Year —WaveXVIIJ, A Supplement, Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan, 1988. The data were collected in annual interviews from 1968 t
1985. The responses concerning annual labor income and hours of work pertain to thi
preceding calendar years 1967—84, while the responses concerning union status and jol
tenure pertain to current employment as of the interview date. Individuals with "majo42
assignments" imputed for labor income or work hours in any year are excluded from our
sample. Details on variable Construction are given below.
Hourly wage rate: Ratio of annual labor income to annual hours of work.
Years of work experience: Calendar year minus birth year minus years of
education minus 6. The education variable (taken from the value recorded in the 1984
interview) is highest grade completed with the category 17 or more assigned a value of 18.
Union status: For 1968—72 and 1974—81, we classify a worker as a union
member if he responded affirmatively to the question "Do you belong to a labor union?"
For 1982-84, we classify him as a union member if he responded affirmatively to both "Is
your current job covered by a union contract?" and "Do you belong to that labor union?"
To assure that the resulting variable is sufficiently consistent over time, we have examined
the years 1976—81, when both question sequences were asked, and found that the
outcomes of our two classification procedures match up quite closely. In the 1973 survey,
union status was not elicited. We classify a worker as a union member in 1973 if (1) he
had been in his current job for at least a year and was a union member in 1972 or (2) he
had been in his current job for less than a year, indicated in 1974 that he had been in his
1974 job for at least a year, and was a union member in 1974. Our construction of the
union variable takes account of the fact that it pertains to current status as of the
interview date, unlike the income and work hours questions. which refer to the preceding
calendar year. For example, our 1984 wage variable is based on the 1985 interview
responses about labor income and work hours, while the 1984 union status variable is
based on the 1984 interview.
Tenure with employer: See Altonji and Shakotko (1985, Appendix 2). Our use of
this variable to identify "stayers" is described in the text.43
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